




Has the financial crisis spurred demand for 
stronger state regulation? 
 







This paper analyses whether the financial crisis has affected citizens’ confidence in the free 
market economy and whether it has triggered citizens’ demand for a free market economy with 
stronger state regulations. Using panel data, the paper confirms that citizens’ confidence levels 
in the free market economy have decreased in most of the largest economies and demand for a 
free market economy with stronger state regulation has increased on both sides of the Atlantic. 
After analysing the determinants for citizens’ confidence in the free market economy and 
demand for a free market economy with stronger state regulation before and after the financial 
crisis, the author concludes that citizens’ net confidence loss in the free market economy seems 
to have been driven by rising unemployment rates, and citizens’ demand for stronger state 
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HAS THE FINANCIAL CRISIS SPURRED DEMAND FOR 
STRONGER STATE REGULATION? 




Research has shown that a certain level of trust in and approval of the market economy is an 
important ingredient in ensuring the smooth running of the economic, political and social 
system. A key question is thus to what extent has the financial crisis undermined trust in both 
markets and institutions, and with what consequences? The purpose of the following paper is to 
address these crucial issues with respect to the large economies in Europe, across the Atlantic 
and Japan. Based on panel data from the GlobeScan survey, which covers the time frame from 
before to after the financial crisis in the large European economies, the US, Canada and Japan, 
this analysis addresses the question of whether the financial crisis has negatively affected 
citizens’ approval for the market economy. Furthermore, it investigates whether the financial 
crisis has increased citizens’ demand for a free market economy with stronger state regulation. 
The damage inflicted by declining rates of approval of the free market economy might represent 
one of the most costly consequences of the crisis. 
1.  Prior Theoretical Reflections 
The financial crisis and its impact on the real economy 
Although economic crises are somehow ‘naturally’ inherent to capitalist systems, as can be 
inferred from historical case studies reaching as far back as the ‘tulip mania’ in the 17
th century 
(see Kindleberger & Aliber 2005), the financial crisis at the end of the first decade of the 21
st 
century has to be considered especially grave owing to the new dimension of global 
connectedness of world economies. Evidence shows that industrial output has fallen more 
sharply in some OECD economies, particularly France, Italy and Sweden, after the most recent 
financial crisis than it did during the Great Depression (Eichengreen & O’Rourke 2009). But 
when did the current financial crisis begin? Most observers agree that early signs could be 
detected in 2007, but the character of the crisis changed completely on 15 September 2008 with 
the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers.
1 Since October 2008, national governments have spent 
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1 Like other financial institutions, Lehmann Brothers needed more credit to back up its business, but due 
to the ongoing trust crisis, the financial markets simply stopped lending money and Lehmann was not 
able to acquire sufficient credit. However, unlike before, in the case of Lehmann Brothers the Federal 
Reserve Bank ceased to act as the lender of last resort, presumably to prevent future moral hazards, and 
did not continue its strategy of backing up financial industry institutions as it had done in the cases of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and other investment banks. With the lender of last resort gone, the panic 
spread from US stock markets to others around the world, resulting in a major crash of global stock 
markets, with clear impact on public confidence in the economy and trust in business. As soon as the 2 | FELIX ROTH 
 
approximately €2.9 trillion (European Commission 2009) in guarantees in order to restore 
citizens’ confidence in the financial markets and in the safety of their own savings. Moreover, 
EU governments have spent €200 billion (European Commission 2008) on stimulus packages to 
prevent the further deterioration of their economies and world economic activity in general. 
Nevertheless, all these measures did not prevent the severest economic crisis since the 1930s. 
The first estimates of the damage of the financial crisis to the real economy were published in 
2009. For example, a study by the Commerzbank (Zeitpunkt 2009) estimates that worldwide 
losses amounted to €7.3 trillion, which equals three-quarters of the yearly GDP of the US and 
three times the GDP of Germany.
2 In the aftermath of the financial crisis GDP has declined by 
5.2% on average in the G7 countries from the first quarter of 2008 to the second quarter of 2009 
and the unemployment rate has increased by 1.67 percentage points on average over the G7 
countries.  
How did the financial crisis affect citizens’ systemic trust? 
The fact that financial markets could come so close to collapse has given citizens a glimpse of 
the fragility of modern finance. They have witnessed the near collapse of the financial industry 
(and consequently the real economy), which could only be rescued by the immense efforts of 
states, as described above. More precisely, citizens have been confronted with the fragility of 
their economic systems and their strong dependence on mutual trust. If the production system 
enjoys sufficient trust, the production process works smoothly, but if this trust is undermined, it 
can have dramatic consequences for the production process. Thus one might conclude that in 
free market economies, trust is an essential input in the production process. Without a sufficient 
level of trust, free market economies cannot function, at least not efficiently. Trust here 
functions as a kind of ‘grease’, facilitating production and minimising transaction costs (see 
Hardin 1982, North 1990, Ostrom 1990 and Fukuyama 1996). From a firm’s perspective, if the 
employer can trust his employees sufficiently, contracts do not need to cover all contingencies. 
Furthermore, if management trusts its employees, it can spend less resources on monitoring 
their performance and more on research and development that enhance innovation.
3 The chain 
of events triggered by the collapse of Lehman Brothers has shattered citizens’ confidence in the 
long run, resulting in lower levels of systemic trust.  
Systemic trust 
According to a number of social scientists (Putnam 2000, Levi 1998, Newton 2001 and 
Luhmann 2000), the concept of trust should be split into three forms: i) thick trust, ii) 
interpersonal trust and iii) systemic or institutional trust. This paper is concerned with the third 
form of trust: citizens’ confidence in their institutions, particularly with citizens’ confidence in 
the overall mode of production. Although the concept of systemic trust has been studied widely 
by sociologists (Luhmann 2000) and political scientists (Zucker 1986, Newton 1997 and 
Putnam 2000), economists have only recently begun to explore the concept in their research 
(Guiso et al. 2004; Guiso 2010; Knell & Stix 2009; Sapienza & Zingales 2009 and Roth 2009). 
                                                                                                                                                            
Federal Reserve and the US Department of Commerce became aware of the disastrous consequences of 
the bankruptcy of Lehmann Brothers on investors’ trust around the globe, they bailed out the American 
International Group (AIG) insurance company on 16 September in order to prevent a global breakdown of 
financial markets and hence also of the real economy. By that time, however, the trust crisis had spread 
around the world. 
2 However, the study warns that the results should be handled with caution. Estimated losses include, for 
instance, insolvencies of banks and value losses in the US housing market. 
3 Nevertheless, the importance of the fear factor in worker-manager relations should also not be 
underestimated (Roth 2010).   HAS THE FINANCIAL CRISIS SPURRED DEMAND FOR STRONGER STATE REGULATION? | 3 
 
Whereas Luhmann differentiates three forms of systemic trust: i) trust in the parliament (trust in 
legitimate power), ii) trust in money
4 and iii) trust in informative authority, most political 
scientists focus solely on confidence in the government (Mishler & Rose 2001, Blind 2006 and 
Chanley et al. 2000). Although this paper agrees that institutional trust is a crucial component of 
systemic trust, it focuses on the more economic dimension of ‘confidence in the mode of 
production’ in its definition. The importance of confidence in free market economies and state 
institutions has also been stressed extensively by policy-makers throughout the financial crisis 
(see Tonkiss 2009).  
What is the potential impact of low systemic trust? Will it lead to more 
public interventionism? 
According to the literature on systemic trust, there are three broad sets of consequences 
associated with increases or decreases in levels of systemic trust. First, accepting the positive 
empirical results on the relationship between interpersonal trust and economic growth (Knack & 
Keefer 1997, Zak & Knack 2001, Whiteley 2000, Beugelsdijk et al. 2004 and Akcomak & Ter 
Weel 2009), one can assume that systemic trust has a positive effect on economic growth. 
However, as most recent empirical results on the macro- and micro-level demonstrate a 
curvilinear relationship between interpersonal trust and economic growth (Roth 2009, Bidault & 
Castello 2009 and Butler et al. 2009), one can conclude that systemic trust is more likely 
curvilinear related to economic growth. Second, systemic trust should be considered crucial to 
the stability of democracy. Various empirical studies have shown that interpersonal trust is 
positively related to democracy (Paxton 1999, 2002 and Gabriel et al. 2002). Trust in the 
government is a basic prerequisite for the legitimacy of those who have been entrusted with 
political power by their citizens (Levi 1998). Levi (1998) claims that citizens are more likely to 
comply with norms if they perceive that: i) the government is trustworthy and ii) other citizens 
are cooperative as well. In particular, Scholz (1998) finds evidence that political as well as 
social trust increases tax law compliance. Blind (2006) asserts instead that the relationship 
between trust and governance should be considered as circular: confidence towards institutions 
enhances efficiency in governance, which in turn fosters political trust. A third consequence 
found in the literature on systemic trust, especially trust of the production regime of free market 
economies, is its effect on citizens’ demand for redistributive policies (Alesina & La Ferrara 
2005 and Aghion et al. 2009). Should citizens not consider the production system as fair and 
just they will start to pressure their national governments for redistributive policy measures and 
more state intervention. In this instance, Alesina & Angeletos (2005) argue that the belief in the 
fair operations of the economic system is associated with a lower incidence of citizens 
demanding redistributive measures. Alesina et al. (2001) stresses this kind of argument when 
assuming that if citizens should feel strongly dissatisfied with the market economy, they may 
respond by pressuring governments to move towards more communitarian/socialist modes of 
production. 
                                                      
4 The importance of the relationship between money and trust cannot be elaborated upon in this paper, as 
it would give rise to another extensive discussion. That money and trust are identical has been stressed by 
economic sociologists such as Perelmann (1998), who stresses that credit is trust and that a crisis of trust 
would evidently lead to a credit crisis within the financial system. Similarly, Helmut Schieber (2000) 
points out that money should be considered as trust. In an interview with Western media, Chinese Premier 
Wen Jiabo told the Financial Times that “confidence is the most important thing, more important than 
gold or currency” (Merk 2009). Former US Labor Secretary Robert Reich argues that “the fundamental 
problem isn’t a lack of capital. It’s a lack of trust and without trust, Wall Street might as well fold up its 
fancy tents” (in Tonkiss 2009: 196). 4 | FELIX ROTH 
 
The following empirical analysis intends to shed some light on this third consequence, 
examining in particular whether the financial crisis has eroded citizens’ confidence in the free 
market economy and whether citizens’ demand for more state regulation has grown.   
2. Previous  Empirical  Results 
To the author’s knowledge, no international comparative empirical research has been conducted 
on the determinants of citizens’ confidence in free market economies and of citizen’s demand 
for a free market economy with stronger state regulation.
5 In particular, no empirical study has 
attempted to evaluate the consequences of the financial crisis on citizens’ net confidence in the 
free market economy. This is simply because publicly available and internationally comparable 
surveys such as the World Value Survey (WVS), European Value Survey (EVS), International 
Social Survey Programme (ISSP) and Eurobarometer (EB) have not included items concerning 
citizens’ confidence in the free market economy, nor questioned whether citizens support a free 
market economy with stronger state regulation. The only empirical study of the determinants of 
confidence in the free market economy known to the author is a case study for Germany (Engel 
2009). Engel analyses a time trend with ten observations and concludes that the level of 
unemployment explains 80% of the variance of the German time trend. His analysis is based on 
data from the Allensbach Institute for Public Opinion Research. Of deeper concern is the notion 
of social market economy, which is based deeply in German and Austrian economic thinking.
6 
Furthermore, a report on the approval of the market economy conducted by the advisory board 
of the German Ministry for Economics and Science and Technology identifies unemployment as 
one of the main drivers for citizen approval of the German market economy 
(Bundesminesterium 2010: 7-8). Although there exists no specific empirical literature on the 
determinants of citizens’ confidence in the free market economy, a field of empirical analyses 
has been formed in economics under the heading of popularity functions. Its literature is vast 
and the first thorough overview is Paldam & Nannestad 1994. This paper does not go into detail 
concerning popularity functions, but the basic idea in the literature is to link public opinion data 
on government support to macro-economic determinants
7 and identify the causal relationships. 
These macro-economic variables are most often GDP growth per capita, inflation and 
unemployment (see Paldam & Nannestad 1994: 218). Furthermore, there is one empirical study 
by Shiller et al. (1991), who analyse the popularity of markets among US and Soviet Union 
citizens in 1990. 
3.  Data and Measurement 
Data 
Finding time trend data on confidence levels in free market economies proved difficult. 
However, the time trend data from the GlobeScan survey
8 conducted in 2002-07 (thus before 
                                                      
5 The author is unaware of any relevant empirical studies concerning the determinants of net confidence in 
the free market using an international country sample but would be happy to receive such empirical 
analyses for incorporation in his research. 
6 Famously, the notion of social market economy was coined by the German Bundeskanzler Ludwig 
Erhard after the Second World War. See also the article by Goldschmidt (2004). 
7 One has to denote that political variables are most often also included in the matching with popularity 
indicators. This paper, however, is focusing solely on macro-economic variables as it tries to explain 
primarily the consequences of the financial crisis on citizens’ net confidence in the free market economy 
and citizens’ increasing demand for more state intervention.   
8 The GlobeScan’s GIM/GSR/CSR tracking data from 2002 to 2009 was purchased from GlobeScan 
Incorporated of Toronto. GlobeScan surveys used are “The Global Issues Monitor (GIM) 2002”, “The HAS THE FINANCIAL CRISIS SPURRED DEMAND FOR STRONGER STATE REGULATION? | 5 
 
the financial crisis) was matched with a data set constructed after the crisis in October-
November 2008 and June-July 2009. This allows the evaluation of the actual impact of the 
financial crisis on citizens’ net confidence and gives some very interesting insights into the 
dynamics of the crisis. Macro-economic variables were taken from the OECD quarterly national 
accounts and were matched with the GlobeScan data. The observations on net confidence were 
surveyed by GlobeScan in the fourth quarter (October to December) of 2001, 2002, 2008 and 
the period June-July, respectively, of 2005, 2007 and 2009.
9 To tackle endogeneity problems, 
the explanatory variables were adjusted to this data pattern by taking the average of the two 
quarters prior to each of the available net confidence observations. We therefore use the second 
and third quarters of 2001, 2002 and 2008 and the fourth quarters of 2004, 2006 and 2008 
combined with the first quarters of 2005, 2007 and 2009 for the explanatory variables. 
•  Confidence in the free market economy is measured by respondents’ answers to the 
statement: “The free enterprise system and free market economy is the best system on 
which to base the future of the world.” Possible answers are “strongly agree”, “somewhat 
agree”, “somewhat disagree” and “strongly disagree”. A net confidence measure is 
constructed by subtracting the percentage of answers “somewhat disagree” and “strongly 
disagree” from the percentage of answers “strongly agree” and “somewhat agree”. Those 
people who answered “neither agree nor disagree” or those who did not give an answer 
were not considered. 
•  Confidence in the free market economy with strong government regulation is measured by 
respondents’ answers to the statement: “The free enterprise system and free market 
economy work best in society’s interests when accompanied by strong government 
regulations.” Net confidence is constructed in the same way as above. 
•  Data on GDP growth is taken from the OECD data set “Monthly Economic Indicators”. 
This data set contains quarterly data on GDP in constant price.  
•  Data on the unemployment rate is taken from the OECD data set “Labour Force Statistics”. 
It measures the harmonised unemployment rate as a percentage of the labour force. 
•  As a measure of inflation we use the Consumer Price Index (CPI), which is taken from the 
OECD data set “Price Indices”. This variable measures the average change in the prices of 
consumer goods and services bought by households with respect to 2005 prices. 
•  The data for private consumption expenditure are taken from the OECD data set “Monthly 
Economic Indicators”. These variables measure all expenditures made on domestically 
produced goods and services. Private consumption expenditure includes all expenditures 
made by the private sector to purchase goods and services. Our variables are measured in 
constant prices.  
Model specification 
The model specification is held very parsimonious, as the number of observations is small 
overall; in particular, it focuses on the time frame before and after the financial crisis, and 
incorporates into the base model the two relevant macro-economic variables identified with the 
                                                                                                                                                            
Global Issues Monitor (GIM) 2003”, “The GlobeScan Report on Issues and Reputation (GSR) 2005”, 
“The GlobeScan Report on Issues and Reputation (GSR) 2007”, “The Corporate Social Responsibility 
Monitor (CSR), 2009”, “The GlobeScan Report on Issues and Reputation (GSR) 2009” (GlobeScan 2002, 
2003, 2005, 2007, 2009a, 2009b). 
9 Japan’s values for the 2005 and 2007 quarters are missing for both confidence variables. Furthermore, 
the 2009 values of confidence in the free market economy with state regulation are missing for all cases.  6 | FELIX ROTH 
 
real economic downturn in the aftermath of the financial crisis: unemployment and GDP 
growth. Furthermore, the variables of consumer price index and private consumption (see Gros 
2009) will be used as control variables to allow a first sensitivity check of the estimated model. 
The baseline fixed effects model for net confidence in the free market economy and net 
confidence for the free market economy with stronger government regulation is modelled as 
follows:  
NCFME/(SGR) i,t =  αi + β Unemployment i,t-1 + μ Growth i,t-1 + ψ Z i,t-1 + wi,t, 
where i represents each country and t represents each time period; NCFME/(SGR) i,t is citizens 
net confidence in the free market economy / net confidence in the free market economy with 
stronger government regulation for country i during period t; Unemployment  i,t-1, Growth  i,t-1, 
and Z i,t-1 are, respectively, unemployment, GDP growth and important macro-economic control 
variables such as private consumption and the consumer price index for country i during period 
t-1; αi represents a group-specific constant term and wi,t is the error term. 
4. Descriptive  Results 
Confidence in the free market economy 
Figure 5.1 shows the time trend for two countries, Germany and France.
10 In both countries, the 
financial crisis had a significant impact on citizens’ net confidence towards free market 
economies. Net confidence levels dropped from 32% to 17% in Germany and from -4% to -15% 
in France. However, unlike in France, where the net confidence levels deteriorated further in 
June-July 2009, in Germany a significant recovery of citizens’ confidence in the free market 
economy can be detected. This recovery to a net confidence level of 0.35% is higher than before 
the financial crisis (the net confidence level amounted to around 0.32% in 2007).
11  

























Source: GlobeScan data: GIM 2002, GIM 2003, GSR 2005, GSR 2007, CSR 2009, GSR 2009. 
                                                      
10 In France, in 2001 and 2003, the interview method chosen was face to face. For all other waves, the 
interviews were conducted over telephone, hence via CATI (Computer Assisted Telephone Interview). 
The data from France from the wave in 2002 were consulted in February 2003. 
11 For Germany the same trend can be observed when analysing German data on citizens’ confidence in 
the social market economy, which highlight a systematic decrease in confidence in the social market 
economy among German citizens up until November-December 2008 and an increase in January 2010 
(Bertelsmann 2010). HAS THE FINANCIAL CRISIS SPURRED DEMAND FOR STRONGER STATE REGULATION? | 7 
 
The German policy responses in the aftermath of the financial crisis seem to have helped restore 
citizens’ confidence. In particular, preventing an increase in unemployment might have secured 
the German government an increase in its citizens’ net confidence (see Gros 2009). In France, 
the net level of -15% deteriorated further to -21%. However, one should also denote the stark 
difference between Germany and France. Whereas Germany’s confidence levels have recovered 
to a net level of over 30%, France’s net confidence level has reached a historical low in 2009. 
The actual difference between Germany and France is thus more than 50% of net confidence. 
Interestingly, as depicted in Figure 5.2, the three Anglo-Saxon countries behave in a completely 
opposite manner. In all three countries, the financial crisis actually reinforced citizens’ support 
for the free market economy. In November-December 2008, net confidence increased from 47% 
to 65% in the US, from 29% to 52% in the UK, and from 36% to 53% in Canada.
12 However, 
unlike in France and Germany, where confidence dropped immediately after 15 September, in 
these three liberal countries a clear drop in confidence is visible nine months later, in June-July 
2009.  

























Source: GlobeScan data: GIM 2002, GIM 2003, GSR 2005, GSR 2007, CSR 2009, GSR 2009. 
Although the levels in the US and the UK are still higher than those of 2007, the conclusion 
should be drawn that, although there has been an increase in the short run, the long-run effect of 
the financial crisis on citizens’ confidence in the free market economy might have been 
significantly affected in these liberal countries. Whereas the UK and Canada have already 
reached levels equal to and below those of Germany, the US still manages to maintain a net 
confidence level of over 50%. The question remains whether the decrease from November-
December 2008 to June-July 2009 is going to continue in the future, implying that Germany 
would reach a higher net confidence level than the US. A similar argument has been stressed by 
Alesina (2009), who raises the question of whether Americans will turn into “inequality-
intolerant Europeans” and therefore hints at the long-term consequences of the financial crisis. 
Figure 3 highlights the actual trends of Italy and Japan. Whereas in Italy a similar trend as in the 
liberal countries can be detected with a first increase in citizens’ net confidence in the free 
market economy and a decline from late October 2008 to mid-July 2009, in Japan there has 
been a massive decline in citizens’ net confidence, from over 21% to -8%. Unfortunately, as 
there has been no data for Japan between 2002 and 2008, so one is not capable of identifying 
how the trend evolved from 2007 to October-November 2008, in the direct aftermath of the 
financial crisis.    
                                                      
12 The same pattern can be observed in the case of Italy. 8 | FELIX ROTH 
 
Figure 3. Trends of net confidence in free market economies in Japan and Italy, 2001-09 
 
Source: GlobeScan data: GIM 2002, GIM 2003, GSR 2005, GSR 2007, CSR 2009, GSR 2009. 
Will the crisis result in citizens’ demand for stronger state regulation? 
Figure 4 highlights the significant increase in citizens’ demand for stronger regulation. In the 
US the increase in net confidence is 20% (from 23% in 2007 before the crisis to 43% in 
November-December 2008 after the crisis), and from 2001 to 2008, the US experienced a 
staggering increase of 36% (from 7% to 43%). In Europe the net increase is 18% (from 33% to 
51%) but only 10% from 2001 to 2009 (from 41% to 51%). Thus the real comparative 
advantage of the US of 34% was diminished to 8% in 2009. However, even more astonishingly, 
in Japan there has been a net increase of 54% from October-December 2002 to November-
December 2008. Thus, in contrast to the opposing results of citizens’ net confidence in the free 
market economy, the trend in the support for a stronger regulated market economy is equally 
distributed on both sides of the Atlantic and Japan.  
Figure 4. EU, G4, US and Japan: free market economy works best with strong regulation 
 
Note: Data on this item are not yet available for June-July 2009 (GSR 2009). 
Source: GlobeScan data: GIM 2002, GIM 2003, GSR 2005, GSR 2007, CSR 2009. 
Which incidences caused by the financial crisis have affected citizens’ net 
confidence?  
Figure 5 shows a partial regression plot between unemployment when controlling for GDP 
growth and country specific effects (Regression 4 in Table 1). The figure clarifies that the 
decrease of citizens’ net confidence in the free market economy in the US, the UK, Canada, 
Italy, and France and the increase in Germany from October-December 2008 to mid-July 2009 
can be explained by the variation of the increase in unemployment over this time period.  HAS THE FINANCIAL CRISIS SPURRED DEMAND FOR STRONGER STATE REGULATION? | 9 
 
Figure 5. Partial regression plot between unemployment and citizens’ net confidence in the free 

































































-1 -.5 0 .5 1
Unemployment
coef = -.14315252, se = .06564488, t = -2.18
 
 
Figure 6 shows a partial regression plot between GDP growth when controlling for 
unemployment and country specific effects (Regression 3 in Table 2) for the time period 
October-December 2007 to October-December 2008. Figure 6 clarifies that the increase in 
citizens’ demand for a free market economy with stronger government regulation can be 
explained by the decrease of GDP growth from October-December 2007 to October-December 
2008. 
Figure 6. Partial regression plot between GDP growth and citizens’ net confidence in the free 
market economy with stronger government regulation in the direct aftermath of the financial 
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5. Econometric  Results 
To analyse the determinants of net confidence in the free market economy, regression 1 in Table 
1 uses a fixed-effects model
13 incorporating all available observations. When analysing the 
sample over the entire observation period (2001-2009), comprising 40 observations from G7 
countries, GDP growth per capita is significantly associated with citizens’ net confidence in the 
free market economy. However, the positive association between GDP growth and citizens’ net 
confidence in the free market economy seems to be driven solely by the four observations of 
Japan, given that when Japan is excluded,
14 in regression 2, the relationship loses significance. 
Regression 3 analyses the three time periods from October-December 2007 to mid-July 2009. 
Both macro-economic variables of GDP growth and unemployment are not able to explain the 
changes in citizens’ net confidence during two periods in the aftermath of the financial crisis. 
However, as the real economic downturn with increasing unemployment rates happened in the 
first quarter of 2009, one might like to focus solely on the two periods from October-December 
2008 to mid-July 2009. Thus regression 4 includes solely the two time periods. In the aftermath 
of the financial crisis unemployment is significantly (90%) associated with citizens’ net 
confidence in the free market economy, even with the inclusion of Japan.
15 As seen in Figure 5, 
when excluding Japan in regression 5, an increase in the unemployment rate is strongly 
associated with a decrease of citizens’ net confidence. Even when adding the control variables 
of private consumption and inflation in regression 6, unemployment remains significant, at the 
90% level. However, the inclusion of private consumption also has an effect on the relationship 
between GDP growth and citizens’ net confidence in the free market economy. When 
controlling for private consumption GDP growth is strongly associated with net confidence. 
                                                      
13 A Prais-Winston corrected standard errors methodology for panel models including country dummies 
was chosen. This is equivalent to a fixed-effects estimator with standard errors corrected for 
heteroscedasticity (and autocorrelation). We test for autocorrelation (Drukker 2003) and within-group 
heteroscedasticity (Greene 2000: 598). We cannot reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation but 
reject the null hypothesis of no heteroscedasticity. Thus we specify the error structure with within-group 
heteroscedasticity. When facing heteroscedastity a Prais-Winston corrected standard errors estimator 
which controls for heteroscedastity achieves more efficient estimates than a simple OLS regressor without 
changing the point estimates of the coefficients.   
14 Excluding Japan renders the data set balanced. That the case of Japan clearly distorts the regressions 
results is also due to data missing for 2005 and 2007. 
15 Japan has to be considered as an outlier, as in the aftermath of the financial crisis its unemployment rate 
remains quite stable, although citizens’ net confidence drops sharply. HAS THE FINANCIAL CRISIS SPURRED DEMAND FOR STRONGER STATE REGULATION? | 11 
 
Table 1. Determinants of Citizens’ Net Confidence for Free Market Economy (NCFME) – Fixed 
Effects Estimation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NCFME NCFME NCFME NCFME NCFME NCFME
Unemployment 0.00800 0.000743 0.0043 -0.101* -0.143*** -0.142*
(0.0176) (0.0171) (0.0289) (0.0534) (0.0419) (0.0794)
Growth 0.0335** 0.0136 0.0232 0.0223 -0.0253 0.125***
(0.0152) (0.0149) (0.0189) (0.0410) (0.0261) (0.0467)









Observations 40 36 20 14 12 12
R-squared 0.830 0.859 0.857 0.930 0.960 0.970
Time Period 2001-2009 2001-2009 2007-2009 2008-2009 2008-2009 2008-2009
N u m b e r  o f  c o u n t r i e s767766
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
To analyse the determinants of citizens’ net demand for stronger government regulation within 
the free market economy, regression 1 in Table 1 uses a fixed-effects model
16 using all available 
observations. When analysing the sample over the entire observation period (2001-2008) with 
33 observations from G7 countries, an increase in unemployment and GDP growth is negatively 
associated with citizens’ increasing demand for more government regulation. As this result is 
especially counterintuitive for the negative factor of increased unemployment, regression 2 
excludes the case of Japan.
17 Unemployment loses its significance, whereas GDP growth is 
strongly negatively related to an increase in citizens’ demand for more government regulation. 
As the paper is particularly interested in the effects of the incidences taking place during the 
financial crisis, regression 3 analyses solely the model under consideration for the two time 
periods: before (October-December 2007) and after the financial crisis (October-December 
2008). The association between GDP growth and citizens’ net demand for a free market 
economy with stronger government regulation becomes stronger and remains highly significant 
(significance at the 99% level). Unemployment has its expected sign and is significant at the 
95% level. As can be inferred from Figure 6, excluding Japan in regression 4 does not alter the 
results. Controlling for additional variables such as inflation and private consumption in 
regression 5 does not alter the results for the association between GDP growth and citizens’ 
increasing demand for a free market economy with more state regulations.  
                                                      
16 A Prais-Winston corrected standard errors methodology for panel models including country dummies 
was chosen. This is equivalent to a fixed-effects estimator with standard errors corrected for 
heteroscedasticity (and autocorrelation). We test for autocorrelation (Drukker 2003) and within-group 
heteroscedasticity (Greene 2000: 598). We cannot reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation but 
reject the null hypothesis of no heteroscedasticity. Thus we specify the error structure with within-group 
heteroscedasticity. When facing heteroscedastity a Prais-Winston corrected standard errors estimator 
which controls for heteroscedastity achieves more efficient estimates than a simple OLS regressor without 
changing the point estimates of the coefficients.   
17 Excluding the case of Japan renders the data set balanced. Similarly to the analysis of the determinants 
of citizens’ net confidence the data gap in the case of Japan in 2005 and 2007 distorts the results within 
the regression. 12 | FELIX ROTH 
 
Table 2. Determinants of Citizens’ Net Demand for Free Market Economy with Stronger 
Government Regulation (NCFME/SGR) – Fixed Effects Estimation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NCFME/SGR NCFME/SGR NCFME/SGR NCFME/SGR NCFME/SGR
Unemployment -0.0366** -0.0174 0.0406** 0.0406** -.0000482 
(0.0178) (0.0135) (0.0160) (0.0160) (0.0214)
Growth -0.123* -0.138*** -0.181*** -0.181*** -0.0932***
(0.0642) (0.0319) (0.0167) (0.0167) (0.00921)
with control variables  no no no no yes
Countries included all Japan excluded all Japan excluded Japan excluded
Observations 33 30 13 12 12
R-squared 0.682 0.784 0.952 0.951 0.974
Time Period 2001-2008 2001-2008 2007-2008 2007-2008 2007-2008
Number of countries 7 6 7 6 6
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
6. Conclusion 
The paper has analysed whether the financial crisis has affected citizens’ confidence in the free 
market economy and triggered citizens’ demand for stronger state regulations. Three main 
conclusions can be drawn. 
First, using panel data the paper confirms that citizens’ confidence levels in the free market 
economy have decreased in most of the G7 economies in the aftermath of the financial crisis 
and demand for stronger state regulation has increased on both sides of the Atlantic. 
Second, the increase or decrease in citizens’ net confidence in the aftermath of the financial 
crisis seems to be strongly associated with the increasing unemployment rates during the 
economic downturn triggered by the financial crisis.   
Third, citizens’ increasing net demand for a free market economy in the direct aftermath of the 
financial crisis seems to be strongly driven by the decrease in GDP growth triggered by the 
financial crisis. 
Overall, the results of the analysis confirm that government policies that were designed to 
prevent a sharp increase in unemployment after the real economic downturn helped to stabilize 
citizens’ net confidence in the free market economy. As a certain level of citizens’ confidence in 
the free market economy has to be regarded as a prerequisite for a smooth production process 
within the capitalistic production systems of the G7 countries, those policies have acquired a 
twofold purpose: besides safeguarding worker skills, they also sustained citizens’ systemic trust 
and overall societal cohesion. Germany’s successful “Kurzarbeit” policy scheme seems to have 
contributed to its being the only country in the G7 that succeeded to increase its citizens’ net 
confidence in the aftermath of the financial crisis. However, the increase in citizens’ demand for 
a free market economy with stronger government regulation in all G7 countries, which was 
triggered by the decline in GDP growth, suggests that in the upcoming years citizens’ will most 
likely reinforce the pressure on the G7 governments for more government regulation. This will 
most likely include citizens’ stronger demand for redistribution and might also include a 
constant call for more regulation in a financial industry that has nearly caused the Western 
capitalistic production system – installed in its current form some 200 years ago –  to collapse. 
However, an increasing demand for more redistribution and thus a call for the extension of HAS THE FINANCIAL CRISIS SPURRED DEMAND FOR STRONGER STATE REGULATION? | 13 
 
welfare state mechanisms contrast sharply with the austerity measures implemented in most G7 
countries to reduce government debt that has increased significantly due to government stimuli 
(including short time work schemes) in the aftermath of the financial crisis and the significant 
decline in GDP. How this contradiction will be resolved and whether it will influence societal 
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